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 1 
Introduction 
 
In teaching economics, it is important to give students a sense of the discipline. This 
includes a feeling for current debate (see eg Dow, 2003). Analysing the different 
arguments within a debate itself requires some pluralism, ie considering different 
approaches to a question. Indeed the pluralist pleas from the French students which 
led to the setting-up of the Post-Autistic Economics Network and what became the 
Real-World Economics Review explicitly called for teaching economics through 
teaching about debates in economics.  
 Discussion of pluralist teaching in economics therefore addresses concerns 
that only one general approach is currently emphasised in economics teaching, and 
that instead students should be exposed to a range of approaches. Already we are 
touching on controversial questions about the nature of our discipline: how far are 
economics, and economics teaching, in fact dominated by one approach? What do we 
mean by approach? What is the justification for considering a range of approaches? If 
students are exposed to different approaches, how are they then to proceed as 
practising economists?  
 The purpose of this paper is to make a specific recommendation for the 
content of pluralist teaching in economics, as a foundation for teaching through 
debates. It will be argued that economics teaching should be pluralist also in the sense 
of including coverage of the methodology of economics and the history of economic 
thought. The questions posed by pluralism are essentially methodological and 
therefore require students to be both methodologically aware and methodologically 
informed. Further, once attention is paid to different approaches to economics, we 
find that these are best understood with reference to different episodes of development 
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in economic thought, as the discipline addressed particular new concerns. History of 
thought can thus make a valuable input. 
 Until the last fifty years, much of economics discourse was pluralist to some 
degree, in allowing for consideration of some diversity of views, and also had 
embedded within it methodological discussion and reference to history of thought 
(Blaug, 1999, 2000, 2003). Indeed we will argue that having the two subjects integral 
to discussion in the various fields of economics would be ideal. However, during a 
transitional phase, a separate teaching focus on methodology and history of thought 
would probably be necessary. This is because our starting point is a discipline 
dominated by the mainstream approach which discourages explicit study of history of 
thought and methodology.  
 In the mainstream, insofar as pluralism is considered, mathematics is seen as 
the solution to what is seen as a regrettable plurality, putting all argument on an equal 
footing. The mathematical modelling requirement has been understood as a neutral 
scientific requirement for rigour, on the grounds that mathematical argument 
translates fairly unproblematically into verbal argument (Krugman, 1998). The form 
of mathematics used is an application of classical logic, where propositions are 
derived logically from axioms taken to be true (ensuring the truth of the propositions). 
Where the truth-value of the axioms is open to question, as in the behavioural 
economics literature, the express aim is to amend these axioms for conformity with 
the evidence, rather than change the structure of argument.  
 Yet the argument has been made by heterodox economists that mathematics 
cannot offer a direct translation of verbal argument, and therefore that mathematical 
argument sets its own bounds on the subject matter (Chick and Dow, 2005; Duran, 
2007).  The issue is whether or not a complete argument can be expressed 
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mathematically, or whether a mathematical argument can only contribute a partial 
argument. In particular, individual decision-makers face knowledge limitations, as 
highlighted by behavioural economists (particularly ‘old’ behavioural economists, 
who draw on Herbert Simon; see Sent, 2004) as well as Post Keynesians (Runde and 
Mizuhara, 2003). The resulting uncertainty is not consistent with a complete formal 
expression of individual behaviour. Similarly the happiness literature, and even more 
so the development wellbeing literature (see Sen, 1985), have highlighted individuals’ 
concern with processes rather than outcomes, which evades expression in terms of 
equilibrium outcomes. Depending on the definition of economics, these approaches 
might or might not be included in the subject. 
 We need to be aware that there is an important asymmetry. By specifying the 
bounds on economics, or indeed even going so far as defining economics, in terms of 
method, the mainstream excludes other approaches which, by that definition, fall 
short. Since these other approaches define economics more in terms of subject matter, 
and allow a range of methods, there is no question for them of excluding mainstream 
economics from the discipline of economics. I am not aware of any heterodox 
economist ever arguing against orthodox economics on the grounds that it is not 
economics. Arguing for or against any one approach to economics is a totally 
different matter and is not at all incompatible with recognition of other approaches 
against which one’s own approach needs to be justified. The non-mainstream 
approach has been more amenable to methodological pluralism, understood in this 
way, than mainstream economics.  
 If students are to understand recent developments in economics, and indeed 
learn about alternative approaches, then a pluralist education must be cast wider than 
the different theoretical approaches within the mainstream to include study of other 
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approaches. It therefore needs to allow for methodological differences. It also needs to 
address the question of pluralism itself. Why should we aim to understand and teach 
different approaches rather than seek a common approach (monism)? The issues of 
debate we have touched on above, and indeed the very notion of different approaches, 
are all methodological. To understand what is involved in studying different 
approaches, therefore, a pluralist education needs to incorporate methodological and 
historical material to raise awareness first, and equip students with the necessary 
analytical tools second. We explore this argument further in the next section. 
 But before we proceed, some clarification of concepts may be helpful. This is 
important since, as we shall see, there is scope for plurality, not only in economic 
theory and methodology, but even in understanding of methodology, history of 
thought and the definition of economics itself. First, I will use the term ‘methodology’ 
in the sense of ‘approach’ to forming economic knowledge; an ‘approach’ involves a 
particular selection of methods, but also entails a view about how to build knowledge 
more generally, about history of thought and about the subject matter of economics. 
For some (non-pluralists) methodology simply involves questions of how to use 
particular methods.  
 Second, pluralism is the argument for plurality, and can apply at a range of 
levels. Methodological pluralism involves recognition of a plurality of methodologies 
to be analysed, and it is this sense of pluralism which will normally be used in what 
follows. Practising economists must adopt one methodology or another, but they can 
also be methodological pluralists if they recognise that there are other possibilities, 
and that there is no absolute set of criteria by which to decide which is best to the 
satisfaction of all. The methodology they adopt can be pluralist or not, ie reliance on 
many methods or one, respectively. So a pluralist approach to teaching involves 
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methodological pluralism, while some of the literature being taught may itself not 
adopt a pluralist methodology. Similarly, within one methodological approach being 
taught there may be a range of theories, ie theoretical plurality.  
 We proceed by considering the historical development of methodology in 
order to understand the different approaches to methodology itself (including attitudes 
to pluralism), from which follow the methodological differences which underpin 
much of the plurality of theory. We then consider how an integrated use of this kind 
of material might work in practice. The case study is taken of teaching about the 
explanations for the current financial and economic crisis, as an illustration. Here 
students can not only learn about the different explanations for the crisis, but can also 
see how different theoretical approaches to money and financial market analysis in the 
past have themselves influenced the institutional arrangements and policy which 
produced the crisis. 
 
Pluralism, Methodology and History of Thought 
If we are to give an explicit role for teaching the methodology of economics in a 
pluralist curriculum, we need to consider further what is involved in methodological 
analysis, since here, too, there are different possible approaches. In particular there are 
different approaches to pluralism itself. We will therefore start this section by 
discussing different approaches to methodology as the field has evolved, and in the 
process we will discuss how ideas about pluralism have developed. We will also 
explore more fully the reasons for the methodological differences within economics. 
It will be argued that methodological and historical understanding is necessary 
ingredients in pluralist education. 
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 Some methodological argument in economics harks back to an old approach to 
methodology, echoes of which still appear in introductory textbooks, in discussion 
among non-methodologists and implicitly in discussion of theory choice. This 
traditional methodology (exemplified by Blaug, 1980) took the approach of 
specifying rules for good science, applied to economics. The dominant influence was 
logical positivism, which defined good science as consisting of testable statements 
arrived at by means of deductive logic (Caldwell, 1982). This provided the 
methodological justification for defining good economics in terms of general 
equilibrium theory which could then be subjected to empirical testing (even if only ‘in 
principle’; see Hahn, 1973).  
 But empirical testing did not prove to be as decisive in discriminating between 
theories as had been expected, for a wide variety of reasons. In spelling out some of 
these reasons, Caldwell (1982) made the first call for pluralism in economics. Given 
that no one approach seemed satisfactory for establishing the best methodological 
approach to economics, then it would be better to consider a range of different 
approaches. This call came as methodology was changing, reflecting the changes in 
philosophy of science itself. One of the major challenges was to the whole notion of 
independent facts as arbiters of theory, without which logical positivism could not be 
sustained. Also a more pluralist tendency was emerging in society, promoting respect 
for a range of political views, social background, race, religion and gender (replacing 
the traditional hierarchical structure). So in social science there was a growing 
recognition of different methodological approaches, without any ultimate set of rules 
by which to demonstrate which was best, ie pluralism.  
 Studying economics from this pluralist perspective can benefit from an 
understanding of the influential framework of Thomas Kuhn (1970a, 1970b), although 
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it requires some adaptation to the social sciences. A methodological approach is like 
his concept of ‘paradigm’. It is based on a particular understanding of the subject 
matter (in the case of economics, how the economy works) and of the best way to 
build knowledge about it. Thus, for example, mainstream economics understands the 
economy in terms of markets, and seeks to build knowledge about it in terms of 
predictable individualistic choice behaviour. The method employed to that end is 
mathematical, such that a theory can be fully represented by a mathematical model. 
Neo-Austrians share the focus on markets and individuals, but understand markets as 
ever-changing, and individual behaviour as creative, so that neither can be captured 
adequately in a mathematical model, nor in macroeconomic analysis, so that the 
primary method is the case study. Post Keynesians focus more on the interdependency 
between the individual and social levels; mathematical modelling is used to contribute 
to argument, but fundamental uncertainty limits the scope for the kind of stable 
behaviour which lends itself to modelling, because of the scope for unpredictable 
discrete shifts as expectations and confidence in them undergo shifts.  
 A key element of Kuhn’s framework was that paradigms are ultimately 
incommensurate. This follows because, not only are theories different, but even the 
meaning of words may be different, reflecting different understandings of the 
economy and the different frameworks developed to analyse it. Equilibrium can be 
understood as an abstract requirement of theory, or as a real state of rest, for example 
(Chick, 2006). A great attraction of mathematics is that it appears to render arguments 
commensurate. But the problem is that in the process it changes and constrains 
arguments which have been developed deliberately beyond mathematics. Indeed it is 
precisely because of this that most non-mainstream approaches differ from the 
mainstream exclusive reliance on mathematical models. 
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 What is involved in methodological pluralism, therefore, is studying these 
different frameworks, with a view to analysing each in its own terms, and also 
discussing the frameworks themselves. But there is no neutral ground; each 
methodologist, and each student as methodological observer, has her own approach. 
However, making that approach explicit at least helps the discussion escape from 
ever-recursive reflexivity. The reader has a clue as to how to interpret the analysis. As 
a result, the bulk of work in methodology now aims as far as possible to describe and 
analyse methodologies. As such it provides useful material for students learning about 
different approaches to economic theory.   
 Modern methodology provides the tools for students themselves to understand 
what lies behind the kind of debate noted above about the nature and scope of 
economics, as well as more specialised debates about how best to analyse a particular 
topic. For example, the critique of logical positivism aids the understanding of the 
debate between theorists and applied economists in behavioural finance. But 
methodological awareness also helps with debates about theory and policy, many of 
which are arguments at cross-purposes because the underlying methodological 
differences have been suppressed. 
 It is through debates between different positions (on methodology, theory or 
policy) that students can learn how to develop their own capacity for judgement as 
economists. By considering the different approaches as well as the different detailed 
arguments, students can prepare themselves for forming their own views. By stepping 
outside the asymmetry of the exclusivist mainstream methodology (which precludes 
discussion of other approaches as being not-economics), some students will discover 
other approaches which accord better with their own understandings of how the 
economy works. But for the many who conclude that they prefer the mainstream 
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approach, understanding why that is the case, and understanding what is meant by 
arguments from other approaches, can only strengthen their capacity for judgement. 
An understanding of methodology should also engender an appropriate modesty 
among economists as to the limitations of our knowledge. 
 It is important to understand what is involved in this pluralism at the 
methodological level, since it is often misunderstood. While it involves an acceptance 
that there is no independent way to decide which approach to adopt, and the 
approaches are in many respects incommensurate, this doesn’t mean that ‘anything 
goes’. It only means that choosing one approach over another is a matter of 
judgement, and debate consists of persuasion (in the absence of demonstrable proof). 
The choice is not free, in that the way we understand the world is the result of what 
Searle (1995), calls ‘deep background’; we are creatures to a considerable extent of 
our social and personal circumstances, as well as the education we receive. But the 
more we are aware of this, the more we can employ reason in our choice of approach, 
and the more constructive is debate.  
 The importance of rhetoric for persuasion was something well-understood by 
Keynes, and now the subject-matter of the rhetoric approach spearheaded by 
McCloskey (1983).  We choose our approach to economics for good reasons, which 
we bring to debate. There also needs to be some commensurability to allow 
communication of reasons; that commensurability is provided substantially by a 
shared subject matter, even though it (and evidence about it) may be understood 
differently, and by shared elements of economics education, even though that might 
have employed different approaches. Any one individual who understood the 
economy completely differently from everyone else, and whose reasons were not 
accepted by anyone else, would not be able to engage in economics discussion 
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(whether or not the reasons were good in their own terms, or nonsense). Kuhn’s 
paradigms were essentially social, referring to shared views within a scientific 
community. He saw progress in science as occurring within these communities, by the 
criteria of these communities. Although, for the physical sciences Kuhn saw 
paradigms as sequential, for the social sciences we can apply his ideas to 
contemporaneous paradigms. What emerges in practices, given the nonindividualistic 
notion of paradigms, is a pluralism structured around a limited range of approaches 
rather than ‘anything goes’ (Dow, 2004). 
 The methodology of the dominant approach will tend to colour the structure of 
economics education. Some have expressed concern that mainstream economics 
education has focused increasingly on mathematical methods, at the expense of other 
methods (Colander and Klamer, 1987; Krueger et al., 1991). As we have seen, this 
characterises the mainstream methodological approach, although the range of 
mathematical methods, and of types of evidence, is expanding.  
 But, while it is argued by some that mathematics is necessary for the 
development of argument (Krugman, 1998; Backhouse, 1998), argument in practice 
even in the mainstream draws on a wide range of methods, ie it is pluralist.  There is 
thus a contrast between the mathematical formalist ‘official discourse’ and the 
plurality of methods of the ‘unofficial discourse’ (McCloskey, 1983). Non-
mainstream approaches which do not accept the exclusivity of mathematical argument 
employ a range of other methods in addition in their official discourse. In particular, 
verbal argument is understood to allow for different content from mathematical 
argument, including in particular discussion of meaning (something which 
mathematics suppresses). For some the only logic is classical logic (which lends itself 
to formal expression). But others (particularly Keynesians, such as Gerrard, 1992) 
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argue in favour of alternative logics. For example Keynes’s ‘human logic’, which 
takes a pluralist approach to knowledge, is appropriate where the truth-value of 
premises is uncertain, and the approach lends itself to conceptual as well as 
mathematical analysis. 
 If mathematical argument is insufficient, and other types of argument are 
required in addition (a pluralist methodology), then judgement is required in order to 
arrive at conclusions (Dow, 2004). This is something made explicit by the Bank of 
England (1999), when discussing the role of models in monetary policy decision-
making. The nature of judgement is seldom discussed in economics, yet clearly it is 
critical for economists in practise, when applying what they have learnt to real-world 
situations. It is important therefore that economics education should equip students by 
training them in judgement. This requires that the curriculum cover different types of 
argumentation and exercises in putting them together in order to arrive at a coherent 
conclusion.  
 In order to even start discussing these things, students need some training in 
methodology. It is not that all discussion or teaching should be explicitly 
methodological. The point is that, without methodological awareness there can be no 
recognition of difference of approach, and, without methodological training, no 
conceptual apparatus with which to discuss it.  
 The arguments for teaching history of economic thought as part of a pluralist 
curriculum follow from the argument for teaching methodology. History of thought 
can be studied for its own sake, as intellectual history, and indeed it is out of such 
detailed archival work that the body of knowledge in history of thought emerges. But 
study of this history of thought is also important as part of a pluralist education. First, 
once we get away from the idea that there is one best interpretation of past ideas (as of 
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current ideas), the history of our subject opens up. For example, does Adam Smith 
really provide unqualified authority for free-market economics? Or, however we 
regard the political conclusions Marx drew from his analysis of capitalism, might we 
not learn from this analysis? Or, does Austrian economics really provide the 
foundation for rational expectations (as Kanotor 1979 suggests)? Have ideas been 
discarded which could now prove useful? How we understand the history of economic 
thought in general, and interpret texts in particular, is itself a matter for debate (see for 
example Weintraub, 1999, and Backhouse, 1999). Exploring such debate in itself 
would contribute to a pluralist education in that it is relevant also to the interpretation 
of contemporary literature.  
 Second, to understand modern economics, with its different approaches, 
students need to understand how it became the way it is. If economics is not fully 
represented by a set of mathematical models, where meanings are taken to be 
uncontentious, then the significance of the models and the meanings attached to them 
can only be grasped by understanding their history (Blaug, 2000). This involves 
understanding the motivation of those who developed new ideas, and the context in 
which these ideas were taken up and developed. The interview format arising from the 
rhetoric approach, and pioneered by Klamer (1984), has helped us understand the 
work of leading economists by helping us to understand their motivation and the 
background to the different paths their work took.  
 Third, the formalist mainstream approach has promoted the view that 
economic thought represents progress, so that everything we have in modern 
economics represents the best of what has been produced in the past. Thus for 
example Lucas (1980) represented rational expectations as progress from Keynes’s 
formulation of expectations under uncertainty; but the very act of ‘operationalising’ 
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uncertainty eliminated it. Any notion of progress is specific to one approach to 
economics – progress to mainstream economists may be regress to non-mainstream 
economists, and vice versa. Once we take a pluralist approach to economics 
education, the way is open to study different periods of economic thought in the terms 
of those periods. What were the problems of the time? Why were they studied in that 
particular way? Are there any ideas from the past which we might want to revive and 
adapt to modern circumstances?  
 
Teaching about the causes of the crisis 
We have argued here at a fairly abstract level that methodology and history of thought 
should be part of a pluralist education in economics, not only to understand the 
different methodologies lying behind different theories, but also to understand 
pluralism itself. We now try to tie these arguments down in an illustration of how this 
might be done in practice. We take the case of explaining the current crisis as an 
excellent example of where important issues are being raised about what had 
conventionally been accepted as good theory and policy. We will see that these issues 
can be illuminated by drawing on methodology and history of thought.  In particular 
we will see that plurality applies at the level of how the crisis is defined and how it is 
explained, in each case building on the history of ideas. Indeed questions of 
theoretical approach have become a matter for public debate (eg in the pages of the 
Financial Times). Methodological pluralism is playing out before us.  
 Students need to develop awareness that the reality of the crisis itself is open 
to different understandings. For commentators on the financial sector it is a matter of 
the behaviour of some key individuals, about judgements and misjudgements, and 
about wild swings in market values. For others outside the financial sector the 
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economic crisis is an occasion for increasing hardship, within those economies which 
had contributed to the financial crisis, but also spreading to those which had adopted 
more prudent financial practices, threatening even more the worsening disparities in 
incomes worldwide. For policy-makers, the crisis also poses important questions 
about confidence in domestic and international institutions. Students can be shown too 
that economic theorists have different understandings of the nature of the crisis, tied 
into different methodological approaches and drawing on different historical ideas.  
 In order first for students to understand the theoretical and institutional 
frameworks within which the crisis arose, they need to be taught about the legacy of 
1980s monetarism, with its logical positivist methodological approach. First New 
Classical monetary theory (see eg Lucas, 1981), then New Keynesian monetary 
theory (see eg Woodford 2003), treated the real economy and money-and-prices 
separately. Central banks could thus be charged with the primary goal of controlling 
inflation, while governments were concerned with real variables. This encouraged the 
practice of making central banks independent of government, charged with pursuing 
inflation targets. This practise was explicit, for example, in the conditions for 
European Monetary Union. At the same time, bank regulation and supervision 
became regarded as a micro concern, detached from inflation targeting, and thus 
administered increasingly by bodies separate from the central bank. The theoretical 
framework had encouraged an institutional framework which proved to be highly 
significant as the crisis developed, in that it impeded both recognition of the 
seriousness of the situation and also the capacity to address it as effectively as 
possible. 
 Students can also be shown that the market conditions which led to the crisis 
can also be understood in terms of this theoretical framework and its underlying 
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methodological framework which gave primacy to mathematical modelling as being 
capable of encompassing the complete picture (within known stochastic variation), 
not only of the economy (for monetary policy purposes), but also of markets. This 
approach reached its apex in the field of finance, where markets were regarded as 
being as close as possible to being the perfect markets of theory. The foundation of 
this approach is that there is a ‘correct’ measure of risk (based on the capital asset 
pricing model), which is embodied in market prices (according to the efficient 
markets hypothesis). As bank assets were increasingly securitised and complex 
derivatives markets developed, quantitative models became the core basis for trading, 
with two of its more successful purveyors (Merton and Scholes) being awarded the 
Nobel prize. 
 But the drawbacks of this methodology had already become evident, for 
example in the 1997-8 crisis. The limitation of these models to extrapolating from the 
past meant that they were unable to predict the structural shift in market pricing as 
perception of risk went through dramatic revisions. But there was no ‘plan B’; the 
models had been treated as sufficient. In the current crisis, the underpricing of risk, 
and the inability of quantitative models to handle discrete shifts, has again been a 
central feature. Yet the institutional structure of markets is built on the pricing of risk, 
and the main plank of central bank control, capital adequacy ratios, is also built on 
assessment of risk, all in terms of quantitative models which were unable to predict 
actual risk in time of crisis. 
 Teaching about the central role in the crisis of these ‘quants’ exposes students 
to a methodological discussion which gets to the heart of how we build knowledge in 
economics (see eg Dow, 2009). Here students can explore a different tradition in the 
history of economic thought. Keynes (1936) was concerned precisely with these 
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matters in the wake of the Great Depression, and drew on his theory of probability 
(Keynes, 1921) to analyse them. Keynes emphasised that fundamental uncertainty 
was the norm, ie conditions under which it was impossible to determine a quantified 
probability. Therefore markets develop practices (conventions) to cope with 
uncertainty, normally promoting stability. But since market valuations cannot be 
demonstrably correct (the future being fundamentally uncertain), they are vulnerable 
to changes in sentiment which can cause discrete shifts in prices.  
 Minsky (1976, 1982) developed Keynes’s ideas into the Financial Instability 
Hypothesis, which many have drawn on to explain financial crisis (see for example 
Arestis and Glickman, 2002; Kregel, 2008; Whelan, 2007; Nesvetailova, 2007; 
Turner, 2008). The theory is built on an understanding of crisis as part of a systemic 
instability in capitalist economies which can be moderated but not eliminated. Minsky 
showed how, during a boom, market valuations become held with increasing 
confidence, encouraging ever-more leveraging, to the point that the financial system 
becomes increasingly fragile, because it is so vulnerable to expectations being 
disappointed. High degrees of leveraging mean that cash flow is critical to meeting 
debt commitments. Once perceived risk is thought to be increasing, the resulting asset 
price falls lead to asset sales and defaults on loans, which encourages banks to curtail 
their lending, further exacerbating the situation. The real economy is affected by 
reduced demand, with the result of increased unemployment. 
 But students can be shown how a very different explanation arises when the 
crisis is seen, not as part of a normal instability, but as an aberration from the norm. A 
different and highly influential explanation of the crisis comes from the New 
Keynesian tradition within the mainstream so still with optimising agents, but subject 
to market imperfections. This approach focuses on knowledge issues, stressing the 
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role of asymmetric information. Their critique of the efficient markets hypothesis is 
based on the idea that market players have different information sets on which they 
base their price expectations and risk assessments (see eg Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). 
Indeed this focus on knowledge lay behind the dominant explanation for the South-
East Asia crisis, and led to the IMF emphasis on improving governance in South-East 
Asian banking, and thus improving information flows (see further Stiglitz, 2002, who 
inspired this ‘Post Washington Consensus’). It is still maintained that, even if only in 
principle, there is a correct measure of risk which can be incorporated in asset prices.  
 Students could be asked to consider, as just one example of the current 
literature, Calomiris’s (2008) comparison of analyses of the current crisis, presented 
at an IMF conference in November 2008. His own New Keynesian approach analyses 
the origins of the crisis in underpricing of risk due to a combination of such factors as 
asymmetric information, market imperfections arising from government involvement 
in financial markets, agency problems and poor governance. He regards as inadequate 
the New Classical (‘fundamentalist’) focus on the need for a correction back to trend 
from the long market rise which these factors had caused, on the grounds that this 
does not explain the initial deviation from trend in this particular case. Similarly he 
rejects the Minsky explanation because it relies on ‘irrational myopia’ without 
supplying a universal theory of human behaviour which can explain why risk is 
underpriced at some times and overpriced at others, and to differing degrees.  
 But then it can be shown to students that Minsky is here being interpreted 
within the New Keynesian approach, which (like the ‘fundamentalist’ approach) 
presumes a rational objective risk measurement benchmark with respect to which the 
market may underprice or overprice. From the Post Keynesian perspective, Minsky is 
arguing rather that, in the absence of such an objective benchmark, markets value risk 
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as best they can. The dynamic of rising markets reduces the perception of risk, while 
that of falling markets increases it, but not in such a way that timing and degree can 
be forecast quantitatively. In these different ways of understanding what is happening, 
we have a clear example of the significance of the methodological framework within 
which we consider competing explanations.  
 More generally this type of analysis helps students see how different 
understandings of what the crisis means, and whether it is systemic or an aberration, 
lead to quite different explanations. In turn, methodological approach predisposes 
economists to understand the crisis in these different ways. Students can also be 
shown how the reality itself can be shaped by the implementation of theories, not only 
in policy but in institutional design. We can look to the history of economic thought in 
Niebyl’s (1946) history of monetary theory for an enlightening discussion of how 
reality, ideas, institutional arrangements and policy impact on each other. But they 
can get seriously out of phase, such that ideas encouraged by one set of circumstances 
eventually become embedded in a new institutional structure which delimits 
subsequent monetary policy, which may be quite inappropriate to new circumstances. 
Students then need to get a sense, not only of how banking and central banking have 
evolved, but also of how the theory of monetary policy has evolved and led to 
particular institutional arrangements and policy stances. A particularly fruitful 
framework has been developed by Chick (1986; 1988; 1993; see also Chick, 2008) for 
analysing the development of banking systems, and the theory of monetary policy 
appropriate to the different stages, through history. The analysis has been updated to 
apply to the current crisis in Chick (2008). 
 In conclusion, in teaching the material covered in this section, students can be 
shown that the crisis raises key methodological issues about market pricing and 
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behaviour in financial markets (and indeed in any market), and the nature of the 
knowledge base. These issues apply also to how we theorise about economic 
behaviour, and therefore about the knowledge base of economics more generally. 
How we resolve these questions (which will differ depending on our methodological 
approach) will determine how we understand markets, and formulate policy. Analysis 
of the crisis at a methodological level also helps students understand the nature of the 
different analyses on offer, and the source of much of the debate about how to 
proceed. We have also seen how each of the different approaches on offer has drawn 
on different traditions in the history of thought.  
 
How to Proceed 
We have argued here for promotion of methodological awareness as a central part of 
pluralist teaching in economics. But dealing with methodological issues poses a 
particular challenge when students are new to this kind of teaching. When the 
impression has been created that there is only one legitimate approach to economics 
(within which there may be differences of theory and method, but not methodology), 
it is hard to get across a methodologically-pluralist approach. There is therefore a 
question of managing the transition to pluralist teaching; indeed the transition may be 
equally important for teachers themselves who are not accustomed to a pluralist 
approach to economics education. 
 I would suggest an initial exercise which I have found effective in managing 
the transition. I use this exercise for students embarking on a course in history of 
thought and methodology, but it could equally be used more generally in a pluralist 
economics course where students have been accustomed to monist teaching. The 
critical step for students to take, and one which is difficult for many to contemplate, is 
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for them to accept that they can legitimately express opinions about economics (not 
just about the choice between this or that model; see Earl, 2000).  
 The exercise is to ask them to choose any piece of writing in economics which 
has struck them for some reason. It may be particularly persuasive, or particularly 
repellent; it may be intriguing, or well-written, or just interesting. Students are asked 
to write a page explaining why they chose that piece, and be prepared to present it to 
the group, who may have differing opinions. Some students grasp the exercise 
quickly, particularly if they have had prior experience of methodological pluralism. 
But for many it is a struggle to understand that they can legitimately form their own 
opinions. However, my experience has been that, once that understanding is achieved, 
there is no looking back. There is no problem thereafter encouraging class discussion, 
and students put great effort into written work. In the process of the pluralist 
education which follows, students learn how to develop their own capacity to judge 
issues and to understand the basis for their judgements. As a result, students become 
equipped to choose their own approach and address alternatives as they become 
practising economists.  
 The transition to incorporating history of thought and methodology into 
pluralist teaching may require some initial specialist teaching of the history of 
economic thought and methodology to provide some background for applying them to 
particular fields, like monetary/macroeconomics as above. These introductory courses 
could be supplemented by specialist history of thought and methodology courses for 
those with a special interest in them. But the main priority should be to equip all 
students to approach economics with an awareness of methodology, and the scope for 
methodological difference, and with a basic knowledge of the history of their subject 
(with its different methodological approaches). Ideally, methodology and history of 
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thought are most effective when woven into economic teaching as the best way to 
understand a field and the debates within it. Indeed this is the political economy 
tradition; history of thought and methodology only became specialist fields, separated 
from the rest of the discipline, when economics came to be taught largely without any 
reference to them. 
 
Conclusion 
The argument for pluralism is a methodological one, itself requiring reference to 
history of thought. But what I have argued here is that methodology and history of 
thought should themselves be an integral part of pluralist teaching in economics. We 
are only in the position of having to consider such questions because the non-pluralist 
development of mainstream economics takes its methodological approach as given 
(and thus an arbiter of quality in the discipline) and makes scant reference to history 
of thought. Once a pluralist approach to teaching economics is established, 
methodology and history of thought would be such a natural part of the discourse that 
we would cease to regard them as separable specialisms. They would become part and 
parcel of how we teach economics. 
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